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ABSTRACT
Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML)
technologies will shape societies by the values they are
programmed to respect. In part because of anti-competitive
Chinese practices such as forced transfers of intellectual
property (IP), companies based in the U.S. have lost the
ability to compete in several fields. To avoid losing
competitiveness in AI/ML sectors, the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) should promulgate
rules blocking Chinese investors from acquiring ownership
interests in U.S. companies when that ownership would
allow access to material nonpublic technical knowledge of
AI/ML. Such a categorical blacklist approach will limit
forced transfers of IP and increase the influence of American
values on the development of AI/ML technology.
“Until recently, the internet in almost every country outside China
has been defined by American platforms with strong free
expression values. There’s no guarantee these values will win out.
A decade ago, almost all of the major internet platforms were
American. Today, six of the top ten are Chinese.”
Mark Zuckerberg1
INTRODUCTION
In January 2020, the Department of the Interior announced that it
had grounded its entire drone fleet.2 Though these drones made more than
10,000 flights in 2018 to help monitor endangered species and survey
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federal land (among other uses),3 the department grounded the fleet over
concerns that the drones’ Chinese manufacturers might have backdoors or
data collection functions which enable cyber espionage.4 The Department
had purchased Chinese-manufactured drones mainly because they are
recognized as the best in the industry: Chinese-owned companies control
more than eighty percent of the market for small unmanned aerial
vehicles.5 Pentagon officials have since remarked on the need for U.S.
manufacturers to regain parity with their Chinese counterparts to ensure a
“safe and secure supply” of domestically manufactured drones.6
Drones are but one technology with a supply chain that has
national security implications for all countries. Acknowledging this, China
promulgated the Made in China 2025 (“MIC 2025”) strategic initiative,
aiming to secure market share in ten industries.7 These industries include
next-generation information technology, robotics, aerospace and aviation
equipment, and new energy vehicles, among others.8 The Chinese
government subsidizes companies in these fields when they achieve
certain goals such as localizing intellectual property (IP).9
China’s goal of localizing IP has implications for the U.S. and its
allies in part because of the way China uses foreign direct investment
(FDI) to accomplish this goal.10 The Chinese government frequently
invests in foreign companies with substantial IP assets,11 either directly or
through a state-owned enterprise (SOE). This investment gives the
government access to proprietary information and technical know-how,
which it may then transfer to all Chinese companies. An example of a
“forced IP transfer,” this process gives a competitive advantage to Chinese
producers relative to their U.S.-based counterparts because the profit
motive that would drive protection of IP assets does not apply to SOEs.
China has begun to use this ability to distort the market to its strategic
advantage.
American responses to forced IP transfers have ramped up. In
2018, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) issued a two-tiered list of
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products on which it would apply a twenty-five percent tariff.12 The list
targeted products benefitting from the above-described forced transfers of
IP.13 Additionally, Congress enacted the Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act |(FIRRMA), which gave more authority to the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to block
certain investments by foreign entities.
Building on these policy reactions, CFIUS should promulgate
rules blocking Chinese investors from acquiring ownership interests in
U.S. companies when that ownership would allow access to material
nonpublic technical knowledge14 in artificial intelligence (AI) and
machine learning (ML). While this would limit the short-run availability
of FDI, failing to address the issue of forced technology transfers may
place the U.S. at a permanent technological disadvantage.

I. BACKGROUND
A. AI and National Security
Failing to maintain parity in ML technologies with other nations
would be detrimental to U.S. national security. A simple scenario, feasible
with existing technology,15 illustrates why: an unidentified group creates
several hundred “deepfakes”—that is, fake video and audio—which
feature Presidential candidates from both political parties making
disturbing statements. Social distrust would spread as voters debate
whether the videos are real, potentially destabilizing the election cycle or
increasing volatility in financial markets. A variety of other more direct
military applications of ML technologies are possible, such as
impersonating military leadership via natural language processing,16
pattern recognition which speeds review of intelligence,17 and use of MLdriven tools in cyber operations.18 Further, commentators have widely
noted the lack of a civilian-military distinction within the country.19 Nondual-use technology could become dual-use.
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Maintaining AI/ML parity may result in solutions to these threats.
Automated deepfake detection technology already exists,20 with major
companies releasing training datasets of deepfaked videos to help improve
detection.21 More importantly, technological parity would ensure that the
technology is at least partially shaped by American interests in freedom of
expression and privacy rather than by those with interests in maximizing
surveillance and control.22
AI/ML parity is no guarantee, however, given China’s centrally
directed efforts and investments made in its pursuit of MIC 2025. China is
actively investing in U.S.-based companies with “militarily relevant” ML
technical knowledge.23 From 2010-2017, Chinese-based investors ramped
up investment in emerging technologies, participating in $1.3 billion
investments in the field over that time and accounting for 29 percent of
Chinese FDI in 2017.24 IP owned by U.S.-based companies with Chinese
investors is at risk of being forcibly transferred. In 2017, the Chinese
Cybersecurity Law became effective, requiring certain companies doing
business in China to keep certain data on local Chinese-based servers25 and
allow certain government officials full access.26 This law has raised
concerns that firms could be asked to provide source code or other IP to
the Chinese government,27 which would allow the code to be illicitly
shared with state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

B. AI/ML as Uniquely Critical Technologies
It is becoming popular to suggest that AI is mostly a buzzword
and is not a big deal.28 Given the failure of other technological buzzwords
20
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to impress—like blockchain29—this makes some sense. AI provides ways
of doing things better and more quickly, but it does not seem to
fundamentally revolutionize the tasks to which it has been applied.
But AI will improve. It is not a bold prediction to say that in
twenty years, AI will be able to fundamentally revolutionize more tasks,
and it will shape those tasks in ways that imbue certain values.
Surveillance cameras with built in ML-driven facial recognition
technology, for example, seem creepy to some but normal to others. How
society chooses to implement technology will define norms for future
generations.
Moreover, AI is particularly prone to monopolies. AI is driven by
data and data processing. Sorting data into a useful format is frequently
difficult, at least for the moment. Moreover, even if we should conquer
that problem, the primary barrier to improving AI algorithms is the time it
takes to train a model on such a large amount of data. Especially when AI
can experiment (such as with human users by showing them different
recommendations and incorporating those reactions into the model),30
organizations that have been around for longer and have more data will
usually have the upper hand against market entrants. Thus, should China
or the U.S. gain a strategic advantage against the other, it may prove
difficult for one to dislodge the other.

II. EXISTING LAW
CFIUS may suspend transactions, mergers, or joint ventures
resulting in a foreign person having control over any U.S. business if the
transaction would pose a risk to national security.31 At CFIUS’s
recommendation, the President may then block the transaction
permanently.32 “Covered transactions” are generally outlined by statute,
and include those resulting in a foreign person having access to “material
nonpublic information,”33 or have involvement in substantive decisionmaking of U.S. businesses regarding critical infrastructure34 and critical
technologies,35 or control over a business which has certain sensitive
personal data about U.S. citizens.36 Transactions of certain real estate may
also be covered.37
CFIUS may review transactions sua sponte38 or because a party to
the transaction formally notifies CFIUS in advance and seeks specific
29
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approval.39 Once CFIUS approves a transaction for which approval was
specifically sought, it may not be re-reviewed.40
The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act
(FIRRMA) in 2018 substantially expanded CFIUS’s authority in
important ways.41 Major changes included allowing the Committee to treat
investors from specified countries differently,42 allowing it to promulgate
rules requiring mandatory filing for certain transactions,43 and broadening
the scope of the Committee’s purview to include certain real estate and
personally identifiable data relating to U.S. citizens.44 FIRRMA also
provided for a $20 million expansion of CFIUS’s appropriation,
presumably to handle its newly-delegated authority and prominence as a
newfound centerpiece of national security law.45

A. Legislative History
Established in 1975 pursuant to an Executive Order, President
Ford created CFIUS to address concerns that certain investments by OPEC
members were politically rather than economically motivated.46 The Order
focused on data collection and descriptive analysis and did not provide the
power to impede foreign investment.47
In response to concerns that the President lacked authority to
collect this sort of data absent legislative mandate, Congress passed the
International Investment Survey Act of 1976 to give the President the
“‘clear and unambiguous authority’ to collect information on
‘international investment.’”48
It was not until the 1988 “Exon-Florio” amendment to the Defense
Production Act that Congress delegated to the President the authority to
block certain acquisitions of U.S. businesses.49 The President could only
exercise that authority, however, if “(1) other U.S. laws were inadequate
or inappropriate to protect the national security and (2) ‘credible evidence’
existed that the foreign interest exercising control might take action that
threatened to impair U.S. national security.”50
The most dramatic change in CFIUS’s statutory authority came
with the passage of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of
2007 (FINSA), which, among other changes, drastically broadened the
number of transactions covered by adding to the list of factors which
39
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CFIUS could use to determine if a transaction impaired national security.51
New factors added by the 2007 law included effects on “critical
infrastructure” or “critical technologies,” as well as “such other factors as
the President or the Committee determine to be appropriate.”52 FINSA also
created measures intended to boost transparency and reporting to
Congress.53
Congress enacted the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA)
along with FIRRMA. The ECRA places export controls on products which
are identified as “foundational and emerging technologies” and “essential
to the national security of the United States.”54 Acquisitions of businesses
with products subject to controls under this provision of the ECRA are
then incorporated by reference as “critical technologies” subject to CFIUS
review.55 While existing export control provisions cover software like
encryption tools,56 there is no general limitation on the export of AI/ML
algorithms.

B. Final Rules
In September 2019, Treasury proposed permanent rules to replace
the pilot program.57 These rules became effective in February 2020.
Most relevant to this note’s proposal is the rules’ creation of an
investor whitelist. FIRRMA required the Committee to define what a
“foreign person” means and to “limit the application of such clauses to the
investments of certain categories of foreign persons.”58 When the rules
were initially proposed, they did not specify exempted countries.59 Rather,
they left the list to a vote of CFIUS members.60
The House Financial Services Committee criticized this decision.
In their October 2019 letter, the House Committee’s leadership wrote to
express their desire that “many U.S. allies, including NATO and nonNATO partners, should remain unaffected by FIRRMA's expansion,” and

51
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other factors redundant, that’s because it is overbroad. To borrow a phrase from a
commentator, “[t]he Committee's legal mandate is replete with discretion.” David
Zaring, CFIUS as Congressional Notification Service, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 81, 84
(2009). FINSA’s broadening of the scope of transactions covered by CFIUS is a
possible legislative reaction to CFIUS’s failure to intervene in a purchase of six
U.S. ports by Dubai Ports World in 2006. See JACKSON, supra note 41, at 4.
53
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Persons, 84 Fed. Reg. 50,174 (Sep. 24, 2019) [hereinafter Notice] (to be codified
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60
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urged the Committee to establish a list as soon as possible.61 In response,
the Committee has “initially selected” Australia, Canada, and the United
Kingdom as excepted foreign states,62 implying that more additions may
be made.
Comments submitted on the proposed rules argued that the
mandatory filing requirements were onerous and made investors more
hesitant63 and businesses more inclined to exclude foreign investors when
possible.64 The comments argued that this burden would be particularly
heavy in fields like biotechnology and venture capital, where deals and
technology move very quickly.65
Direct impacts on Chinese FDI are already becoming clear.
Chinese venture investment declined in the U.S. during the first half of
2019, about 27 percent over the preceding two quarters.66 However, some
commentators have noted that “CFIUS appears ill-equipped to police the
venture-capital industry,”67 raising questions about compliance rates in
industries related to AI and ML technologies.
There is a clear desire among stakeholders for categorical rules
and regulatory certainty. Of all the submissions during the public comment
period,68 by far the most common request was for the Committee to act
quickly to add their preferred country to the whitelist.69 Others did not
explicitly request a country to be added to the whitelist, but rather
requested published criteria so they could understand what guidelines

61
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foreign state in order to avoid a mandatory CFIUS filing”).
64
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65
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67
Id.
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Your author has read all of them. The volume of well-drafted and almost
certainly well-compensated comments makes clear the need for disinterested
commentary on the subject.
69
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needed to be met to be on the whitelist.70 This reflects a larger desire for
transparency which partly motivates this paper’s proposal.

C. Ralls and Other Limitations on Authority of CFIUS
Some commentators note that the law covers “potentially tens of
thousands [of transactions] each year.”71 But “[w]hile CFIUS’s reach is
broad, it is not infinite.”72 What limitations exist?
The constitution provides some constraint, explored for the first
and only time by a court in Ralls Corporation v. Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States.73 Ralls was a U.S.-based company owned
by two Chinese nationals. In 2012, Ralls purchased four companies with
assets allowing development of wind farms in Oregon within restricted
airspace and near a bombing zone maintained by the U.S. Navy.74 Ralls
then notified the Committee of the acquisition and responded to several
questions but was never informed of the significance of CFIUS’s
inquiries.75 In the following months, the Committee ordered Ralls to
suspend the wind farm’s development and conducted an investigation.76
After the investigation and finding that Ralls “might take action that
threatens to impair the national security of the United States,” the
President issued a divestment order which required Ralls to sell its interest
in the wind farms.77
Ralls contended that, under the Due Process Clause,78 it was
entitled to know the grounds on which CFIUS made its decision and be
given the opportunity to present its side to the Committee. A three-judge
panel of the D.C. Circuit agreed: its 2014 opinion held that “due process
requires, at the least, that an affected party be informed of the official
action, be given access to the unclassified evidence on which the official
actor relied and be afforded an opportunity to rebut that evidence.”79
Ralls has come under fire from multiple sides. Some argue that it
requires the executive to surrender information that should properly be
70

See, e.g., Nancy McLernon, Comments on Provisions Pertaining to Certain
Investments in the United States by Foreign Persons, 84 Fed. Reg. 50,174 and
Provisions Pertaining to Certain Transactions by Foreign Persons Involving Real
Estate in the United States, 84 FR 50214, ORG. FOR INT’L INVESTMENT 2 (Oct.
17, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=TREAS-DO-2019-00080048.
71
Farhad Jalinous et al., CFIUS Reform Becomes Law: What FIRRMA Means for
Industry, WHITE & CASE 2 (2018), https://www.whitecase.com
/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/cfius-reform-becomes-lawwhat-firrma-means-for-industry.pdf.
72
U.S. Export Controls and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS) Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 115th Cong. 2 (2018)
(statement of Hon. Marco Mancuso, Senior Visiting Fellow, Hudson Institute).
73
758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
74
Id. at 304.
75
Id. at 305.
76
Id.
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Id. at 306.
78
Ralls Corp. 758 F.3d, at 306.
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Id. at 319.
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subject to executive privilege and part of the executive’s inherent authority
to maintain international relations.80 Other commentators suggest that
Ralls does not do enough to protect property interests.81
The other major limitation on CFIUS’s authority over covered
transactions is its own rules. As one commentator remarks, “[t]he
negotiated solution [to CFIUS’s expansive authority] appears to be
deferring to CFIUS to ‘prescribe regulations’ . . . .”82

III. CREATING CATEGORICAL RULES PROHIBITING CERTAIN
INVESTMENT
A. Proposal
CFIUS should adopt rules that block Chinese investors from
acquiring ownership interests in U.S. companies if that ownership would
allow access to material nonpublic technical knowledge in AI/ML. This
approach is a categorical blacklist, as opposed to the individualized, ad
hoc assessments in current practice.

B. Statutory Authorization for the Proposal
CFIUS has statutory authority to implement a categorical
prohibition like the one proposed. FIRRMA explicitly authorizes the
Committee to single out an individual country for greater scrutiny,83 such
as China in this proposal. In fact, in commenting on the existing proposed
rules, a letter from the House Committee on Financial Services noted that
“Treasury has opted for a so-called white list interpretation instead of a
black list [sic],” but that “such an approach is not compulsory under
FIRRMA.”84 Rather, the law merely requires Treasury to define what a
“foreign person” means and to “limit the application of such clauses to the
investments of certain categories of foreign persons,”85 which it has
chosen to do through an as-yet-to-be-promulgated whitelist. This paper
argues in favor of a blacklist approach.

C. Categorical Rules and Ralls
A categorical rule like the one offered here could be subject to
challenge on the grounds that Ralls procedural due process86 requires an
individualized assessment of each blocked transaction.

80

See Christopher M. Fitzpatrick, Where Ralls Went Wrong: CFIUS, the Courts,
and the Balance of Liberty and Security, 101 CORNELL L. Rᴇᴠ. 1087, 1111 (2016).
81
See Yang Wang, Incorporating the Third Branch of Government Into U.S.
National Security Review of Foreign Investment, 38 HOUS. J. INT’L L., 323, 345
(2016).
82
Jalinous, supra note 71, at 2.
83
See 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(E). The proposed rules currently under
consideration do not use this authority to target any particular country. See
CATHLEEN D. CIMINO-ISAACS & JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
IF11334, CFIUS: NEW FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW REGULATIONS 2 (2019).
84
H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVICES, supra note 61.
85
50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(E).
86
Ralls is the controlling precedent as challenges to CFIUS actions must be
brought in the D.C. Circuit. See 50 U.S.C. § 4565(e)(2).
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Certain factors not present in Ralls would act in the government’s
favor in a new case, however. The Ralls Court mentioned,87 and it has been
widely noted in the literature,88 that the government in that case simply did
not raise the issue of executive privilege until oral arguments at the
appellate level.89 This oversight may have left a persuasive argument
unexplored. Additionally, the enactment of FIRRMA four years after Ralls
decidedly reaffirmed Congress’ intent to delegate substantial power to the
Committee. Given the broad language of FIRRMA, it is difficult to
imagine what actions might be beyond the power Congress intended to
delegate.
A strong analogy exists between the discretion given to CFIUS to
identify national security risks and the President’s authority under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to declare
emergencies. In the leading case on the subject, Dames & Moore v. Regan,
the Court was unbothered by the infringement on economic liberty by the
President’s powers under IEEPA.90
The Ralls court was able to distinguish Dames & Moore by noting
that the transaction in Ralls had already been completed, and thus the
property right had been fully vested.91 But a categorical rule like this
proposal would bar future transactions, where property rights had not yet
been vested. The critical distinction drawn by the Ralls Court would not
be possible in a future review of this paper’s proposal.

D. Discussion
China has consolidated control of the majority of market share in
many sectors, including drones,92 telecom equipment,93 surveillance
cameras,94 and internet-of-things devices.95 These categories of devices
have serious privacy and data security concerns.96 The Department of
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/default/files/Research/SOSi_China's%20Internet%20of%20Things.pdf.
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Defense is spending millions to reignite domestic innovation and
manufacturing in these sectors, and these technologies are relatively
straightforward to manufacture and design. Conversely, AI/ML
technologies are particularly vulnerable to runaway leaders. Many AI/ML
solutions interact with huge quantities of data and improve as they are
used.97 This creates a kind of network effect that entrenches the front
runner. If China pulls ahead, the U.S. may never catch up.98
1. Economic Impacts.
The benefits of FDI are well established and vital to the continued
growth of the U.S. economy.99 Failing to “consistently attract sufficient
(benign) FDI into the U.S. would present a long-term, systemic national
security risk.”100 Beyond the macro effects, however, are the micro effects
on individual businesses. Blocking all non-passive FDI in ML technology
will almost certainly reduce short-run innovation. Some commentators
have suggested that this might send technical expertise away from Silicon
Valley and to China.101
The premise of this note is, however, is that FDI is already driving
the U.S. inexorably towards that end. FDI will merely ensure a future
monopoly over high-end ML technology via forced technology transfers.
That monopoly would have a chilling effect on innovation, as cheaper and
better foreign products flood the U.S. market but with no way for U.S.
companies to build on these products. This note’s proposal for a
categorical rule would engender the creation and maintenance of a selfsustaining cycle of innovation instead of allowing IP to be slowly siphoned
away.
Moreover, Chinese FDI accounts for a relatively limited portion
of total investment stock. In 2017, FDI into the United States exceeded $4
Chinese firms wishing to sell IoT products in the United States and the security
and privacy of U.S. citizens”).
97
See Matt Turck, The Power of Data Network Effects, MATTTURCK.COM (Jan. 4,
2016), https://mattturck.com/the-power-of-data-network-effects/ (noting that “the
more users use your product, the more data they contribute; the more data they
contribute, the smarter your product becomes”).
98
China already enjoys a substantial lead in data collection and availability due
to lax privacy protections. See Natalie Sherman, Is China gaining an edge in
artificial intelligence?, BBC (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/
news/business-50255191 (“‘If the government decides that it's going to have
country-wide electronic medical records . . . then it's going to happen.’” (quoting
Tom Mitchell)).
99
See John K. Mullen & Martin Williams, Foreign Direct Investment and
Regional Economic Performance, 58 KYKLOS 265, 279 (2005) (“We find that
inward foreign investment plays a strong, vital role in regional economic
activity.”).
100
Mancuso, supra note 72.
101
See Justin Shields, Note, Smart Machines and Smarter Policy: Foreign
Investment Regulation, National Security, and Technology Transfer in the Age
of Artificial Intelligence, 51 J. MARSHALL L. Rᴇᴠ. 279, 298 (2018) (“U.S.
regulatory action also has the potential to deprive the U.S. AI industry of
knowledge inputs from Chinese firms and Chinese talent that can increase the
competitiveness of the industry.”).
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trillion.102 Of that amount, 84 percent was by European, Canadian, and
Japanese investors,103 traditional allies which would likely be considered
excepted countries under the Committee’s whitelist.
As tensions have risen between the U.S. and China in recent years,
commentators have begun to fear the “The Great Decoupling.”104
Decoupling refers to the bifurcation of economies, social structures, and
technological development in a way reminiscent of the Cold War.
The decoupling has already begun; indeed, China and the U.S.
have never been fully coupled. The Great Firewall, for example, has made
American tech giants largely powerless to achieve the market dominance
that they have seen elsewhere in the world.105 Social media networks,
usually driven by network effects,106 are likewise powerless as China has
walled itself off to promote its domestic alternatives.107
While the transitionary period away from reliance on Chinese FDI
may cause market headwinds, the U.S. should be able to mitigate the
effects of decoupling and avoid isolating itself. It must reinvest in its allies.
It could do so through a “multilateral regime under which firms subject to
potential government influence in their corporate decision-making must
demonstrate their ‘eligibility’ to engage in outbound M&A.”108 This could
take the form of categorical rules providing for a whitelist, as in the
Committee’s proposed rules.
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2. Transparency
Commentators have noted that “relatively little is known about
CFIUS decision-making and the types of evidence that are used.”109 Much
to the chagrin of the burgeoning crop of national security lawyers in large
firms thriving on this uncertainty,110 a bright-line standard prohibiting all
transactions of this type would turn an expansive and expensive regulation
into a yes-or-no question for all but certain edge cases. This standard
would reduce transaction costs dramatically and enable investors to make
acquisitions more quickly, without having to wait for CFIUS approval or
enduring the uncertainty of not requesting a review.
A categorical approach like the one proposed here would also
improve CFIUS’s credibility. CFIUS currently appears arbitrary: a survey
of Chinese investors in 2016 found that 43 percent thought the CFIUS
process was “politically charged.”111 Another 43 percent expressed lack of
knowledge: only 13 percent expressed a positive view.112
In 2010, CFIUS voted not to block a Russian acquisition of a
uranium mining company, Uranium One.113 It was later revealed that the
Clinton Foundation had received various donations from a several
involved parties.114 As it turns out, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
was only tangentially involved, and the vote, which involved
representatives from many agencies, was unanimous. 115 But those facts
have not stopped the issue from being a recurring theme in national
discourse years after the events.116 Categorical rules like the one proposed
in this paper would provide regulatory certainty and limit the ground for
Uranium One-style controversy.
3. Ethical Development of AI/ML Technology.
Some commentators have suggested that closing off the market
would be tantamount to ceding U.S. authority.117 On the contrary, recent
109
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experience shows that robust market demand will keep tech companies
interested enough to change practices. The General Data Privacy
Regulation (GDPR)—which ostensibly applies only within the EU—has
forced changes by every major tech company worldwide.118 Instead of
forcing a flight of tech companies from Europe, it has imposed
quintessentially European perspectives on data privacy on monolithic tech
firms.119 Limiting investment may create a similar greenhouse in the U.S.
where it can exercise ethical leadership. As a Pentagon official noted in a
recent press conference:
It’s become circular — if you want to make sure that there are ethics
principles that are attached to AI, you have to have the AI . . . . [I]f
other people have the AI and you don't, then you're already in second
place and you can't really do anything about making sure there are
ethical principles involved.120

CONCLUSION
AI/ML technologies will shape societies by the values they are
programmed to respect. In part because of Chinese anti-competitive
practices, the United States has lost the ability to compete in several fields,
including commercial drones,121 surveillance cameras,122 and some
telecom equipment.123 It would be disastrous if the U.S. lost parity with
AI/ML technologies in the same way.
CFIUS, as powerful as it has become, has intervened in only a
handful of transactions124 despite its portrayal by detractors as
“shadowy.”125 It has been cautious with its power. But when a clear threat
arises, and Congress has delegated power to deal with that threat, a
president and her officers must act. China is spending millions of dollars
to secure American IP, and those investments drain long-term staying
power from the U.S. economy in exchange for short term influxes of cash.
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The president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, L.
Rafael Reif, penned an editorial in the New York Times discussing the
relative technological advantages of the U.S. and China.126 He writes:
If all we do in response to China’s ambition is to try to double-lock
all our doors, I believe we will lock ourselves into mediocrity. But if
we in the United States respect China as a rising competitor with
many strengths we can learn from, that view will inspire America to
be its incomparable best.127

Reif is right. The strength of the U.S. and its tech sector is not
within the borders of the U.S. alone, but is in its position as a superpower
leading liberal democracies across the globe. This paper’s proposal is not
alone a solution. Rather, CFIUS should be one piece of a larger strategy.
But it is a necessary piece. To preserve American competitiveness
and ethical leadership128 in the next generation of technological
advancement, CFIUS should take decisive and categorical action to defend
American enterprise and abandon the piecemeal and cautious approach it
has thus far employed.
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